Ocean Environment

The ocean is a wilderness reaching round the globe, wilder than a Bengal jungle, and fuller of monsters, washing the very wharves of our cities and the gardens of our sea-side residences. Serpents, bears, hyenas, tigers rapidly vanish as civilization advances, but the most populous and civilized city cannot scare a shark far from its wharves.
[Thoreau1906, vol. 4, p.188]
{ Does this seem like a good introductory ocean quote? Any other suggestions? }

A seastead needs to survive and thrive in the ocean environment. In this section we'll describe that environment, its dangers, and our plans for avoiding them..

What is the ocean environment? Obviously, it consists of a great deal of salt water (about 3% solution.) The disolved salt causes two problems -- first, it causes many materials to corrode and second, it renders the water unfit for drinking. In addition to the water, the ocean environment has weather. This includes temperature variation, wind, humidity, rain, etc. Convection and Coriolis effects cause movement of the air (wind) and water (currents) in roughly consistent patterns. The wind causes the growth of waves which can become quite significant.

The ocean is full of life, from tiny algae to the largest living creature: Balaenoptera musculus , the blue whale. The most dangerous marine creature, however, is homo sapiens, whose warships have teeth sharper than any shark. Correspodingly, the most complicated element of the ocean environment is the labyrinthine system of laws and regulations that humans have developed to govern it.

Waves

Ocean Wave Basics

The high point of an ocean wave is called the crest, and the low point is the trough. The distance from crest to trough is of course the wave height, and the distance between successive crests is known as the wavelength. Waves are created by wind blowing on the oceans surface, which steadily adds energy to them. The size of waves thus depends on how hard and for how long the wind blows. Because waves can travel long distances without losing much energy, they may appear when there is no wind, having been produced by some distant storm.

While it may appear that waves consist of water moving linearly, in reality each water particle simply travels in a circle. The water transmits energy without being carried along. This is why small free-floating objects on the surface just bob up and down in waves. Even in huge waves, a piece of driftwood doesn't get broken, just shaken around a lot.

However, our potential seastead designs are not like this. Objects that are large or heavy don't just roll with the waves, they resist and must absorb some energy. For them, the ocean is a much more hostile environment. The amount of energy stored in a large wave is quite scary, hence why they occasionally pulverize large ships. You'll first learn about the biggest waves, and then about our strategies for avoiding them.

Tsunamis

Many people think of the tsunami as the most fearsome wave, but that's a landlubber's perspective. Generally driven by earthquakes, tsunamis are often unnoticeable in the deep ocean, where they have extremely long wavelengths and low wave heights (several meters at most, usually much less).

As this wave reaches a continental shelf, it piles up, becoming shorter and higher. Only then will it resemble the monsters of legend - and as usual, legend exaggerates. Tsunamis rarely result in giant breaking waves, but are more like very strong, fast tides [USGSTsunami]. While this is very dangerous for coastal structures (as the horror of the 2004 Asian tsunami demonstrated), even if a seastead was close to shore, it would just rise with the water level. The worst consequence would be the mooring system failing or being damaged.

Now we'll see a case where the storytellers, not the scientists, turned out to be right.

Rogue Waves

They were struck by a rogue wave - a monstrous wall of water that rose out of nowhere and slammed onto the deck like the fist of god. Ships often don't survive an onslaught like that. Many sink before anyone on board knows what's hit them.
[Lawton2001]

On the right is perhaps the only photograph of an elusive phenomenon known as a rogue wave. Not many people would reach for a camera when struck by such a monster, but that's exactly what Phillipe Lijour did. He was onboard the oil freighter Esso Languedoc in 1980 when it was struck by a rogue. By his estimate, most waves were 5-10m, as you tell from the low seas in the background. The mast visible on the starboard side is 25m above sea level, and the wave is breaking from behind the ship. The wave was at least 20m high, perhaps 30m (since its trough, as well as crest, would be lower than other waves).

Scientists used to dismiss such tales of unusually large waves as mere folklore, like monsters or mermaids. But with the proliferation of oil and gas platforms, some of which record wave data, accumulated observations have finally led to mainstream acceptance of this seafaring "myth" [Lawton2001]. And recent data from the European Space Agency's ERS satellites has not only re-confirmed the existence of these waves, but indicated that they may be fairly common. Researchers with the MaxWave project computer-analyzed satellite photos from a three-week period in 2001 during which two ships were hit by 30m rogues. They found "ten individual giant waves around the globe above 25 metres in height." [ESA2004].

These rogue waves are the real dangers in open water. Towering above their neighbors, they are unstable and break quickly, thus containing tremendous power. They sometimes come unexpectedly from a different direction than the prevailing swell, which adds to the surprise and danger. Rogues have been known to ravage coastlines as well, sometimes coming out of calm seas to sweep away unsuspecting victims. Emergency services have warned beachgoers in some areas to be aware of this danger [RogueWarning].

Understanding rogue waves is clearly quite important for marine safety. Hence while their existence has only been accepted for a few decades, a decent-sized body of academic work has sprung up. There was a Rogue Wave conference in 2000 [RogueWaves2000]. Theories about their existence include interference patterns (refraction/diffraction), current/wind interactions, and normal variations in the height of wave groups. These theories are problematic, however. Interference ought to produce a bell-shaped distribution, but high outliers occur much more often than that. Also, in the open ocean it is unclear what would cause an interference pattern. Current interactions don't explain the many rogue waves in areas without fast-flowing currents. Focusing effects of some type seem to be the most promising. They are difficult to analyze on messy real-life waves, but some non-linear mathematial models have produced focusing and shown promise at replicating the observed distribution [NorwayRogueGroup]. And the MaxWave team is starting a new investigation called WaveAtlas to further study the distribution of rogue waves.

The question of how big waves get and how often they hit is of far more than academic importance. Most offshore platforms and cargo ships have been designed assuming the standard distribution. This is why rogue waves are so dangerous - not just because they are big, but because they are unexpectedly big, and so structures are not designed to handle them. We can see that a seastead intended to last decades must be prepared to withstand these "Monsters of the Deep".

Wave Height

To design a safe and reasonably-priced seastead, we need to know what wave heights to expect. Most important is the worst-case height. Since this will depend on the exact region and seasons, we'll just give a general overview, as well as sources for additional information. Wave height is a function of wind strength and the "fetch", which is the distance over which the wave been building. Oceanographers use a statistic for wave height called the "significant height", denoted H_s. This is the average of the 1/3 highest waves (from crest to trough) over a given time period (20 minutes for [NDBC] buoys). One wave in a thousand is twice H_s, and about one wave in three-hundred thousand is a so-called "rogue" whose height is two and a half to three times H_s [Bascom1980]. However, this distribution may reflect out-dated assumptions about rogue rarity, and must be investigated further.

The National Data Buoy Center [NDBC], part of the NOAA, is a good source for wave height information. Data from several hundred buoys (not all theirs) is accessible on their website, often with historical records. The highest waves ever recorded by the NDBC buoys were in the North Pacific, near the Aleutian Islands, and had an H_s of 18m. A rogue wave in that storm could have reached a staggering 48m in height. The location is no accident. While 100-foot waves in the North Atlantic are rare enough that it took a "Perfect Storm" to create them, David Gilhousen, a metereologist with the NDBC, says that in the North Pacific "sea waves of that magnitude are something you would see every other year -- maybe every year" [Chui2000]. Not the best place to build a seastead.

The highest wave ever accurately assessed at sea was seen from the USS Ramapo on February 6, 1933, and measured at 34m by triangulating on the crows nest. The ship was on passage from the Philippines to California during a hurricane with a wind force measured at 68 knots. The storm lasted 7 days and stretched from Asia to New York, producing strong winds over thousands of miles of unobstructed ocean. Other sources have reported rogue waves of 17.5m (Skourop, North Sea), 26m (1/1/95, North Sea), 28m (1943, North Atlantic, the Queen Elizabeth), and 29m (1995, North Atlantic, the Queen Elizabeth 2) [Lawton2001].

It not only takes strong winds to generate these monster waves, it also takes a long fetch. For this reason, sheltered seas like the Mediterranean and the Caribbean experience smaller waves even during severe storms. The doldrums around the equator, where winds are low, are another area with much smaller waves. Cautious seasteaders may wish to gain some experience in these places before venturing into rougher areas.

Calamity

"One thing about the sea. Men will get tired, metal will get tired, anything will get tired before the sea gets tired" - A marine engineer's observation about the tragic collapse of TT-4.

The loss of Texas Tower Four demonstrates the disasters that can occur when a flawed structure encounters the tremendous power of the ocean. The tower was one of three manned radar platforms off the US Atlantic coast numbered Two, Three, and Four (One and Five were planned but never built). The tower, part of the nations air defense system, "was such a spectacular sight that ocean liners veered off course to permit passengers to glimpse it" [TexasTowersRD, p. 95]. Because it was a lonely post, the interior of each tower had libraries, gyms, and rec rooms. Music, movies, and even a daily ration of beer helped entertain the crew.

Things began to go wrong with Four from the beginning. Built in a Portland, Maine shipyard, it was completed in June of 1957. While a convoy was towing it to its permanent location, a sudden storm struck and damaged the tower. (For those with an engineering bent, it tore off the diagonal cross braces on the legs). Because of the cost and time delays involved in towing it back for repair, the tower was installed anyway (the civilian contracter said that the damage could be repaired on-scene). This problem was especially serious because TT-4 had legs more than twice as long as the other towers and needed these missing supports. Divers later installed an extra piece to compensate, but it proved insufficient for the task. Even modest waves caused the structure to tremble (earning it the nickname "Old Shaky"), and over time the bracing was compromised. Again, divers attempted to repair it, but in September of 1960, Hurricane Donna destroyed the patchwork repairs with 132mph winds and 50-foot waves [Ray1965].

The towers lurching worsened and most of those onboard were evacuated, but a skeleton crew remained. They were there to protect the millions of dollars in radar equipment from the Russians, and to maintain the tower while more repairs were attempted. In January of 1961 there were 28 crew, half of them USAF personnel and half a civilian repair team. Warned by radio of an approaching storm, the next cargo ship offered to evacuate the tower, but orders from land said for the men to stay on the tower and the ship to stand by. The chain of command for the towers was poorly designed, and apparently the superior officer on land was unsure of his authority to evacuate the station.

The storm arrived, and while it batterred the waiting cargo ship and the shaking tower with 85mph winds and 35-foot waves, the commander on shore finally decided to evacuate during the next lull. Helicopters from the Coast Guard waited to take off the moment the weather permitted, and the Towers crew frantically cleared off the flight deck. But the weather refused to slacken, and under the incredulous eyes of the cargo ship captain, the radar image of Texas Tower Four disappeared from his screen. All hands were lost. [TexasTowersRD]

It was later determined that one of the three legs had broken under the strain, rendering the tripod of support unstable. Its important to note that Towers Two and Three survived this and many other Atlantic storms over the next few years, although they were evacuated a number of times to ensure that no repeat tragedy ocurred. Eventually currents weakened the foundations and they were decommissioned. (We'd like to note here that the TT's weakness was their supporting legs, which our design avoids entirely).

The lesson is not that permanent manned sea structures are impossibly dangerous, but that the ocean does not forgive mistakes. Great care must be taken in the design and building of seasteads to ensure their absence from the annals of marine tragedy. This will increase their expense, but safety - a matter of life and death - is no place for shortcuts.

Avoiding Waves

Because waves are so dangerous, we think its quite important to be able to avoid or nullify them. Our preferred design, the spar platform, handles this by lofting the living space above the waves on a tall pillar. While this keeps a seastead from being pummelled by the waves around it, it may also want to avoid big waves in the first place. Since a seasteads only place in the America's Cup race would be as a buoy, this requires planning well in advance. There are other methods for minimizing this danger as well. Here are the techniques we consider:

• Build a pillared seastead (fixed or free-floating), with a sufficiently long spar that waves don't hit the platform.
• Use natural or artificial breakwaters to protect structures from the waves.
• Build underwater structures.
• Choose an anchorage or roaming area without large waves, like the equatorial doldrums or a protected sea. Or, since storms tend to be seasonal, stay in these locations during the dangerous seasons.
• Actively avoid storms by moving around. Small waves grow into large waves slowly, so thanks to metereological satellites and computer prediction, it is reasonable to expect around 5 days of advance notice in which to avoid bad waves [Chui2000]. This gives enough time for a sailboat fleet to run away, although not a lumbering platform.

Currents

It is not only the oceans surface that is continually moving. Currents are everywhere as well, and unless we anchor they will push our platform around. Approaches to dealing with this are outlined in the Transportation section.

Currents tend to consist of large cyclical formations with opposite direction of rotation in the northern and southern hemispheres. They range in speed up to about 2.5 m/s. They are caused by a number of factors, such as wind, convection, density differences due to variations in salinity, and the Coriolis force. The chart below will give you a general feel for the arrangement of currents:

However, it must be noted that these maps are deceptively simple. Ocean currents form many eddies and transient features, and vary from season to season and year to year.

Wind

Pleasant it is, when winds disturb the surface of the vast sea, to watch from land another's mighty struggle.
Lucretius

As anyone who has been in a sailboat or forgotten their jacket can tell you, air may be thin but it can still transfer a lot of energy. Because wind will move seasteads around, batter them during storms, and help them generate electricity, it is an important part of our ocean environment. There are basically two kinds of winds we need to worry about, the good kind which blow slowly and steadily, and the bad kind which swoop in occasionally and try to steal anything which isn't nailed down.

General Circulation

As with currents, global forces cause wind to have consistent, large-scale patterns. The equator receives more heat, so the air above it is warm and rises. As a response, the surface air nearby (+/- 30° lat.) is drawn towards the equator to replace the risen air. Together, these form a classic convection cell. At the equator itself, since the air is rising (and new air coming in from both sides), there are no steady surface winds - the wind is vertical instead of horizontal. Since vertical wind doesn't generate waves, this area enjoys calm weather and is called the doldrums.

Farther from the equator in both hemispheres (30-60° lat.), the Coriolis Effect dominates, making the winds blow from west to east relative to the earth's surface. Above the poles, the air cools and sinks, forming another pair of convection cells.

These steady winds will be quite useful for energy generation, as described in further detail in the Wind Power section, which also contains a map of worldwide wind resources. Their consistency makes them an excellent energy source, since storing energy is relatively expensive. Unlike solar energy, which arrives for half of the day at best, the trade winds blow around the clock. Wind speed and energy grow significantly with height (this is why wind turbines are on tall poles), and seasteads are already high up to avoid the waves. Though they may necessitate a sweatshirt when going on deck, the trade winds are our friends.

One downside of the constant winds is the salt spray they carry. This can result in salt accumulation on surfaces, which is undesirable for gardens, trees, and farm animals.

Ill Winds

{ This subsection is new and quite rough }

Tropical storms, cyclones, and hurricanes have strong winds that can destroy conventional buildings, as well as triggering strange dream sequences that go eerily well with Pink Floyd albums. Luckily, even a Category 5 hurricane will have trouble lifting concrete off to the Land of Oz. For instance, a concrete Monolithic Dome called the Eye of the Storm was built on an island in south Carolina to replace a home lost to Hurricane Hugo in 1989 [MDI]. It and other domes were in the news after the relentless hurricane season of 2004 [MDI_Ivan], which they weathered without a blink.

Hurricanes are rated according to the Saffir-Simpson Scale:

Storms of all sizes come with advance warning nowadays, thanks to the global network of weather satellites. Clouds are easy enough to see from space, and clever image processing even allows for estimates of wind and waves. As an article about the infamous "Perfect Storm" states:

Back then, he said, forecasters had to rely on scattered readings from buoys or ship crews to gauge the state of the wind and seas. And the computer graphics that help them quickly grasp and interpret weather data were not as advanced...In the nine years since the Andrea Gail went down, computer models have improved to the point where forecasters can give people at sea five days' warning of severe wind and waves, compared with two days in 1991, said Joe Sienkiewicz, a senior forecaster with the National Weather Service's Marine Prediction Center in Camp Springs, Md. Satellites now sweep their radar and microwave eyes over the ocean surface, taking in swaths 930 miles wide, and beam back information on wind speed and direction.

While the exact occurence and course of any storm are unpredictable, the general trend is quite consistent. There is a "hurricane season" in late summer and fall (which are opposite months in the Northern and Southern hemispheres). Storms usually move westward and at less than 20mph, so there is plenty of advance warning (although course tracking is imperfect). The most dangerous part of a storm is the quadrant where the rotational and translational velocities add. As with the trade winds, speeds increase as you rise above sea level, which means that seastead platforms will be subject to some pretty strong forces. Because of its shape, the upper part of a seastead will act like a wing, and its design must take into account these aerodynamic characteristics.

While winds will be stronger blowing unobstructed over the oceans, a major advantage is that they will carry very little debris. Even at 150 mph, wind is much easier to withstand than tree branches. A University of Missouri-Rolla study confirmed this, saying "We concluded that the majority of damage didn't come from high wind pressures as many building designers originally thought, but from windborne debris impacts." [Kaiser2000]. Other experiments have confirmed this:

Evidence from an experiment at Texas Tech University's Wind Engineering Research Center (Concrete Products, August 1998) seems to confirm the intuitively obvious: Of all commercial building materials, concrete provides the greatest resistance to extreme high winds and debris...The greatest inherent danger to people and property during the high winds of tornadoes and hurricanes is the debris carried in the high winds. Flying at such intense velocity, wreckage can cut right through a building wall and endanger the people inside. Tests conducted by Texas Tech University's Wind Engineering Research Center offer dramatic proof that concrete walls withstand flying debris from tornadoes and hurricanes-and outperform their wood and steel counterparts. To duplicate tornado-like conditions in the laboratory, researchers shot wall sections with 15-lb. 2 Yen 4 lumber "missiles" at up to 100 mph, simulating debris carried in a 250-mph wind. These conditions cover all but the most severe tornadoes.
[ConcreteProducts1998]

Flooding, which erodes foundations and washes through lower stories, causes much of the damage on land. This "storm surge", happens because the pressure from a storm piles up the water, increasing its level. However, it will have little effect on seasteads, which are already floating and will simply rise with the water (though there are some minor complications for anchoring [link to engineering of anchoring]). Listing (leaning to the side) due to wind forces is a not likely to be a major problem, even in high winds, as we explain in the relevant FAQ.

Given that most damage comes from storm surge and debris, it does not appear to us that hurricane winds are a major danger for seasteads. Waves are the real danger. When it comes to wind, the seastead should actually have an easier time than coastal residents. Some precautions will still be required.

Energy gathering may cease during a storm, with wind turbines taken down and PV panels ineffective. Generators will most likely take up the slack, although special turbines geared for higher velocities could be deployed during storms (perhaps a good time to test DIY Savonius rotors).

As with waves, seasteads will need to be built to withstand the worst winds they may encounter. While pictures of smashed homes fill our television screens after a hurricane, these structures are generally small and cheap. In the US, government backing of insurance companies is likely part of the explanation for this choice. In many places, it is due to poverty. As the Texas Towers tragedy taught us, seasteads must be built to last. Like the third little pig, we'll choose a material that can't be blown down.

Politics

{ Most of this section is new. Since politics is quite a complicated issue, its pretty rough too. Since there is so much to say, its a bit long and disorganized. We'd love to hear any clarifications from those with more than our scant knowledge of international maritime law }

Political Situation

An unavoidable aspect of the ocean environment is the large body of international law which pertains to it. (For information about the law applying to islands, see [Dyke1999] and [Gjetnes2000].) Seasteads may be classified as ships (flagged or unflagged), installations, or artificial islands. The basic tenet of maritime law is that vessels and structures are considered to be under the jurisdiction of some country, as if they were its soil (much like embassies):

Under admiralty, the ship's flag determines the source of law. For example, a ship flying the American flag in the Persian Gulf would be subject to American admiralty law; and a ship flying a Norwegian flag in American waters will be subject to Norwegian admiralty law. This also applies to criminal law governing the ship's crew. But the ship must be flying the flag legitimately; that is, there must be more than insubstantial contact between the ship and its flag, in order for the law of the flag to apply. American courts may refuse jurisdiction where it would involve applying the law of another country, although in general international law does seek uniformity in admiralty law.

[LIIAdmiralty]

This system has the advantage that each seastead can seek the protection of any nation on earth, however distant. This competitive market and the ease of switching mean that we have a good chance to get better terms than any country's residents. Still, its important to realize the utter lack of rights held by individuals in international law, where only States count as entities. This is exemplified by the Boarding subsection.

Several summaries have been written about maritime law as it relates to building floating cities, see [Fitzpatrick1998] and [Kardol1999]. Another interesting reference is is the Navy's summary of international law for ship captains [NWP-LAW].

It is worth noting here that we'll just be talking about what we are and are not supposed to do according to international law. For example, when we suggest that regulations on safety may be avoidable, we are not saying that no attention should be paid to safety. What we do believe is that different people will make different decisions about issues like safety. For this reason, we think its worthwhile to discuss legal constraints as a separate entity, one of many inputs to individual decisions.

Another caveat is that for the most part we'll either be talking about international or United States laws and policies. There are far too many variations in other countries and regions to cover here.

Political Zones

The first thing to note is the separation of the ocean into several types of zones, each with different usage rights. Here are the basic categories:

Territorial Seas

Extending for 3-12 nm (usually 12), a country's Territorial Seas are an extension of its sovereignty over land. In fact, the 3nm original limit was chosen as the area which could be defended by cannonfire from land. While there are some exceptions (ie it is not allowed to block the passage of innocent ships), generally the country has complete jurisdiction.

Contiguous Zone

According to UNLOS Article 33 [UNLOS], this is a zone contiguous to the territorial sea where the owner may exercise the control necessary to enforce its laws and regulations within the territory and territorial sea. For example, customs enforcement and drug interdiction are performed here. This creates similar problems to the territorial seas. Fortunately the total of territorial seas CZ may not extend more than 24 nm, at which point you might expect to be on the High Seas. In the old days, you would have been right.

Exclusive Economic Zone

Stretching for up to 200 nm past the territorial seas, the EEZ was a customary norm by at latest 1975 [Gjetnes2000] and was formally introduced in the 1982 UNLOS convention. It is part of the trend towards expanding maritime limits stimulated by the desire to exploit offshore oil and gas resources. The definition of an EEZ is:

A maritime zone seaward of the territorial sea with an outer boundary that may be up to 200 miles out from the territorial sea's baselines. Within this, a coastal state may regulate: (1) nonliving resources, including the seabed, subsoil, and superjacent waters; (2) living resources, including fish, crustaceans, and plants; (3) other economic resources, such as the production of energy from the water, currents, and winds; (4) artificial islands, installations, and structures; (5) marine scientific research; and (6) pollution control. [IntLawDict]

Some states, such as the United Kingdom, have only claimed jurisdiction over living resources, thus an "Exclusive Fishing Zone" rather than an EEZ, which is more compatible with the seastead way of life. We are not sure if coastal states with EFZ's claim the right to regulate artificial structures. Let's examine each of these provisions:

1. This is not really a problem, seasteads aren't trying to steal oil.
2. Seasteads also aren't trying to steal fishing rights. However, they will want to do mariculture. Thus the question of whether the coastal state can regulate living resources entirely produced, rather than harvested, is important.
3. This is certainly a problem, although it seems rather unfair. If seasteads capture some solar or wind energy, this does not cost the coastal state anything. The clause was probably meant to make sure that if large off-shore power generation becomes cost-effective, states can control it. It seems politically unlikely that seasteads would be prosecuted for generating power in a clean and sustainable fashion, but further research is necessary.
4. This is the most clearly relevant clause. The exact legal differences between ships and artificial structures will be relevant, and seasteads may be able to sidestep this restriction by being ships. If not, this clause makes it pretty clear that coastal states can regulate seasteads in their EEZ.
5. Again, this seems unfair, and politically unlikely to be enforced. If seasteads want to do marine scientific research, they will probably be allowed to. However it is something to keep in mind in case the research is somehow politically sensitive.
6. This gives the coastal state some right to regulate pollution from a seastead. Since we expect seasteads to be very clean, this should not be much of a practical problem. Coming to reasonable agreements with the state should not be hard. However, if there is political tension, the state could impose unreasonable demands through this clause as a means of attack.

Its worth noting that the EEZ is essentially concerned with resources. The law of the coastal state does not apply in the EEZ, and it does not have general enforcement rights. Other than as regards resources, EEZs are counted as the high seas.

Interestingly enough, the US is one of the major objectors to the EEZ system. They are worried that EEZs could become special security zones which restrict the passage of American warships. This could occur through steadily creeping jurisdiction. For example, while pollution controls don't currently apply to warships (gorillas don't need table manners), this could be one route to regulation. They also worry that international straits - narrow passages in key locations - will be regulated. The right of free passage through places like the straights of Gibraltar is key to international maritime trade.

The 200nm EEZ may soon go the way of the 3nm territorial sea. Article 76 of UNLOS suggests that EEZ's may sometimes be extended up to 350nm, or the 2500m isobath, based on the continental slope and sediment thickness of the seafloor. In addition, the 1982 UNLOS and 1994 extension authorized the creation of the International Seabed Authority. The ISA, which began operation in 1996, has authority over the resources of the seabed of the entire globe.

There are other worrisome signs of this "creeping jurisdiction". After the 1989 Exxon Valdez disaster in Alaskan waters, Chile passed a controversial law in 1991 extending its ocean boundaries 2,000 miles west to Easter Island and south to the Antarctic. So Chile is now unilaterally claiming approximately 1/5th of the Pacific Ocean [StrategicOCeans, p. 3].

It is no surprise that, when there are valuable resources present, nations attempt to extend their authority. After all, there is no one there to object. This makes it imperative that the seasteading movement develop before too much of the ocean is claimed, and certainly before too much of it is being actually exploited. Otherwise our legal and political position will be more tenuous, and possible locations more limited. Also, this strengthens the case for mobile seasteads, which have the option of moving if political conditions change.

Exclusive Fishing Zone

Some states, rather than claiming full EEZs, only claim Exclusive Fishing Zones. EFZs don't include mineral rights, however we are uncertain whether they include the other regulatory rights. The Mediterranean appears to consist mostly of EFZs rather than EEZs.

High Seas

Finally we get to the high seas, that last bastion of freedom. Subject to some caveats regarding the deep seabed, "In the high seas, the freedom to construct artificial islands and installations is given to all States, whether land-locked or coastal." [Fitzpatrick1998]. While this is nice, it doesn't say anything about the rights of non-States. One can interpret various UN articles to derive that any group of people has the right to form a state [Kardol1999], but this rests on somewhat shaky ground.

To be in the high seas, one must avoid EEZs entirely. The hard way to do this is to be 200 nm from anywhere, which will have a negative impact on many areas of the seaconomy, especially trade and tourism. The easier method is to take advantage of areas, such as the Mediterranean Sea, where EEZs are much smaller or nonexistent.

Special Zones

There are also numerous special cases. A continent-sized example is unsettled Antarctica, which has been portioned out according to an international treaty.

International boundaries are oft disputed and always complex. There are some commercial Geographic Information Systems (GIS) databases containing maritime claims data. These tend to be a bit expensive because they are sold only to governmental organizations, as well as being difficult to produce because of the morass of varying claims. This makes location planning somewhat difficult, although the general distance guidelines help. Seasteaders will probably wish to obtain or make use of these before making any final decisions about location.

A rough idea of EEZs can be seen in [SeaAroundUs], though it does not differentiate between EEZs and EFZs. A list of maritime claims can be found in [MaritimeClaims]. A commercial GIS database of maritime claims is sold by Veridian for $1500/year [GMBD].

Ships

Erwin Strauss summarizes the situation for ships in the book How To Start Your Own Country:

Although many countries are expanding their claimed territorial waters, there are likely to be wide areas of the oceans that will remain open to ships of all nations for some time. Treaties that are accepted virtually universally require all ships to fly the flag of an existing nation. Those that do not are defined as pirates, and are subject to treatment as such by any nation's warships. Most nations require ships flying their flag to employ their own nationals, and generally subject them to the onshore laws of that country. However, there are certain small nations that specialize in granting ships the permission to fly their flags with a minimum of restrictions. In return, these countries receive annual fees in the range of a few thousand dollars per ship or less. These flags are called "flags of convenience," and the owners of ships flying those flags are allowed to hire anyone they want, and generally do just about anything they want. Certain international treaties banning piracy, the drug traffic, the slave trade, etc., still apply, but the countries involved are small and can hardly police their worldwide fleets - and aren't really interested in doing so.

[Strauss1984, page 24]

Artificial Islands / Installations

Since we're dealing with the law, we need a precise legal definition for these terms: "Artificial islands and installations are man-made, surrounded by water from all sides, above water at high tide, supposed to stay at a specific geographical location for a certain span of time, and stationary in their normal mode of operation at sea." [Fitzpatrick1998]. So anchored seasteads clearly fit the definition and powered seasteads which move constantly do not (they'd be classified as ships). Its not clear from this how we'd classify drifting seasteads (unpowered, unanchored).

Next we have the difference between artificial islands and installations: "Artificial islands can be distinguished from installations, by asking whether the whole artifact can be moved from its location at sea without losing its integrity, If it can be moved, it qualifies as an installation. If it is impossible to move it qualifies as an artificial island." [Fitzpatrick1998] From this we see that of the two choices, our seastead design is an "installation". Platforms on pillars connected to the ground would be artificial islands.

Only the coastal state may build artificial islands and installations in its territorial sea. Only the coastal state can build artificial islands in its EEZ, as well as installations which serve an economic purpose. On the High Seas, however, any state can build artificial islands and installations. This does not extend its maritime zones, nor are such artificial islands and installations entitled to a territorial sea. They can, however, claim a safety zone of up to 500 meters where they can regulate traffic and navigation [Fitzpatrick1998], from [UNLOS, Articles 60(4) and 80]. Such installations are not entitled to an EEZ or continental shelf claim (and neither is an island which "cannot sustain human habitation or economic life of its own" [UNLOS, Article 121.3], interpreted in [Gjetnes2000, pp. 48-73]).

An internet encyclopedia discusses the political problems with artificial islands:

Legal quandaries similar to the statehood of Sealand are no longer possible today. Since the third conference on the laws of the sea, the nearest neighboring state is now required to consent to the construction of any artificial island pursuant to the convention on the laws of the sea of the United Nations on December 10, 1982, in Montego Bay. Moreover, this convention requires the neighboring state to pull down the artificial constructions immediately after use or to have them removed.

According to this convention, there is no transitional law and no possibility to consent to the existence of such a construction which was previously approved or built by the neighboring state. This means that it is unimaginable that a case like Sealand will ever occur again. An artificial island can no longer be constructed and then claimed as a sovereign state, or as state territory for the purposes of extension of an exclusive economic zone or territorial waters.

[Wikipedia-Sealand]

It is not clear whether non-states have the right to construct artificial platforms, since international law only makes reference to states.

SOLAS

The set of rules relating to maritime safety is the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, known as SOLAS [SOLAS]. It was first created in 1914 in response to the Titanic disaster, and has been under the auspices of the International Maritime Organization since it was created in 1960. While the latest Convention was adopted in 1974, it has been amended and updated many times since this. It sets standards in many areas, including compartment subdivisions (II-1), fire protection (II-2), lifesavers (III), and dangerous goods (VII). SOLAS mandates the international Safety Management (ISM) code, which can be tedious to comply with.

UNLOS

Currently, the closest to a unified body of rules governing the oceans is the United Nations Law of the Sea [UNLOS], a convention negotiated between 1973 and 1982. While it has been signed by 157 states (as of 2003), the number of signatories to later modifications is much lower. Also, the current global superpower, the USA, never signed the original treaty due to disagreements about the deep seabed mining provisions [Reagan1983]. However, these portions of the UNLOS have been modified by the Agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI of the Convention . The US has agreed to the revision (along with many other nations).

Enforcement

Enforcement of this morass, however, is pretty spotty. Its not like there are international safety officers on board every ship, and its hard to monitor the ocean or every ship in it. Organizations like the IMO which help make the rules have no enforcement power. As one source says: "both the IMO and the UN are bereaucracies without the resources to enforce the laws and actually prevent such abuses." [StrategicOceans, p. 4]

Its mostly up to flagging countries, and no one has much incentive to enforce the rules. To address the lack of oversight by flaggers, more power is being given to ports. Fortunately, most seasteads won't need to call at ports, and so they can sidestep this control.

Boarding, Arrest, Search, Seizure

The basic rules for boarding and search are that permission of either the captain, the owner, or the flagging country is necessary. There is also the "right of approach and visit", which allows a nation to approach a vessel to verify its nationality. It can then board when it has reason to question that nationality, the vessel is without nationality, or engaged in piracy, slavery, or unauthorized broadcasts [UNLOS, art. 110]. A country can also do whatever it likes in its territorial waters and contiguous zone. Outside, when dealing with ships flagged by other countries, its rights are much more limited:

Maritime law enforcement action may be taken against a flag vessel of one nation within the national waters of another nation when there are reasonable grounds for believing that the vessel is engaged in violation of the coastal nation's laws applicable in those waters, including the illicit traffic of drugs. Similarly, such law enforcement action may be taken against foreign flag vessels without authorization of the flag nation in the coastal nation's contiguous zone (for fiscal, immigration, sanitary and customs violations), in the exclusive economic zone (for all natural resources violations), and over the continental shelf (for seabed resource violations). In the particular case of counter-drug law enforcement (of primary interest to the Department of Defense), coastal nation law enforcement can take place in its internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, or contiguous zone without the authorization of the flag nation. Otherwise, such a vessel is generally subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of the nation of the flag it flies. Important exceptions to that principle are...

[NWP-LAW 3.11.2.2]

Note that outside the contiguous zone, only natural resource and seabed violations may be unilaterally investigated.

It is worth noting that the US Coast Goard (aided by the Navy) does not even stick to these permissive rules. They board and search suspected drug-runners without bothering to get permission in advance. This reminds us of the 800-pound gorilla in the old joke: Where does he sit? Anywhere he wants to...

An excellent and depressing review of US legal precedent can be found in [Kopel2001]. We reproduce the key sections here:

The Svesda Maru was spotted by a U.S. Customs airplane, stopped by a U.S. Navy Guided Missile Frigate some 1,500 miles from U.S. shores and boarded by an accompanying Coast Guard Law Enforcement Detachment (LEDET) who searched the ship for five days before being relieved by an actual Coast Guard Cutter, whose crew found the drugs.

The U.S. Code (Title 14, sect. 89) gives the Coast Guard the authority to "At any time, to go on board of any vessel subject to the jurisdiction, or to the operation of any law, of the United States, address inquiries to those on board, examine the ships documents and examine, inspect and search the vessel" In other words, Congress has repealed the Fourth Amendment for everyone on a ship.

The Coast Guard can come onboard and snoop around whenever it wants. Recreational boaters in coastal waters tell numerous stories about the Coast Guard inviting itself onto fishing boats, sailing sloops, and every other kind of boat, in order to start looking about for a stray joint, as a pretext to seize ship. Federal forfeiture laws promote this form of legalized piracy.

"Coast Guard" naval operations have put the Coast Guard very far from America's coast: in Ecuador, Guatemala, and even on the rivers of land-locked Bolivia. (Likewise, the United States Border Patrol has also been sent to Bolivia.) The Coast Guard gets the credit for the bust, but it is the Navy and the Navy's drug interdiction budget that runs the drug war at sea.

One of the authors, Mike Krause, served in the Coast Guard from 1989-1991, including five joint agency Caribbean patrols on the Coast Guard Cutter Hamilton . If the Hamilton wanted to board a foreign vessel in international waters to look for drugs, the crew would simply ask. Now why would the master of a ship, outside U.S. territorial waters, consent to the U.S. Navy/Coast Guard boarding his ship? Because it is more coercion than consent.

The Hamilton was 378-feet long and in addition to her main 3-inch gun and an array of M-60 machine gun mounts, she carried six harpoon missiles on her bow. The captain of a ship in the middle of the ocean would be hard-pressed to turn down a request from a warship capable of blowing him out of the water. This would be similar to a squad of police on your front porch pointing guns in your general direction, then "asking" to come inside and look around.

But even if a ship's captain refused, it really doesn't matter. The Coast Guard already has blanket permission from some nations to board foreign flagged ships.

The Svesda Maru was caught in the "Transit Zone", a six million square mile area that includes the Caribbean Sea, the Gulf of Mexico, and the Eastern Pacific Ocean, over which the U.S. seeks to enforce international anti-smuggling laws, even over foreign vessels and in cooperating nations' sovereign waters.

Only the flagging state, not the owner or captain, can question whether a boarding was appropriate. (Only States have rights in international law, not people.)

Persons charged with a crime under section 1903 do not have standing to raise issues of international law. See 46 U.S.C. app. ¤ 1903(d). By enacting section 1903(d), Congress intended to eliminate jurisdictional impediments to convictions under the statute. See S. REP. NO. 99-530, at 16 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5986, 6001. As set forth in the Senate Report:

"In the view of the Committee, only the flag nation of a vessel should have a right to question whether the Coast Guard has boarded that vessel with the required consent. The international law of jurisdiction is an issue between sovereign nations. Drug smuggling is universally recognized criminal behavior, and defendants should not be allowed to inject these collateral issues into their trials.

...

The exact timing of a flag nation's permission is not a condition to consent under subsection (c)(1)(C). A defendant may be tried for an offense under the statute if the flag nation acquiesces after a vessel is commandeered. See Greer , 223 F.3d at 55 (finding that the United States had jurisdiction over a vessel even when the flag nation consented five years after the completion of the offense).

[USAvBustos]

Warrants are unnecessary for ship searches under US law because ships are mobile and so could be moved while the warrant was being sought. However, probable cause is still required.

We must note that many of these boarding issues are only likely to be worries if drugs are permitted on board. We'll discuss this touchy issue more later. "Although neither convention explicitly says so, it also appears that any warship may seize a merchant vessel that has no nationality. In United States v. Cortes, for instance, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Convention on the High Seas conferred no rights whatsoever on stateless vessels and upheld the seizure of an unregistered ship found by the Coast Guard to be transporting marijuana." [WMDLegal]

Interference

We'd like to admit here that there is a definite danger of other nations interfering in the internal affairs of a seastead. People have quite different viewpoints on how much of a problem this will be, so we'll make our point in two opposite contexts.

First, there are those who ask whether anyone would dare interfere. Will the nations of the world really put up with it? Won't they be worried that they'll be next? Unfortunately, history has made the answer clear. When the meddler is a major world power, there may be squawks but real resistance is unlikely (remember that gorilla). There is always some clever way to spin things, and it will be easy enough to brand seasteads as Communists or Terrorists to justify interference. The big boys have always done what they want, and while we sure hope that seasteads are a long-term threat to that power structure, in the short-term they have no chance. And don't even think about WMD's as the answer [Strauss1984, 18-24]. Developing them is expensive, and in the current political climate they're a fast track to satrapy for states and incarceration for individuals. In short, this is a nice time to take a deep breath, let those macho urges subside, and reiterate our philosophy of compromise.

On the other side are those who ask what the point of seasteading is. "They'll never let you have any freedom", say these doubters, often libertarians bitter over the steady growth of government power. We think the best answer to this is exactly the same as last time: compromise. "Live free or die" may be romantic, but the land claimed by its adherents generally lies about six feet deeper than they intended. Our goal is not absolute freedom, but whatever degree we can reasonably get. We find the following to be an encouraging exercise for libertarians about just what level is attainable:

Look at current states and consider the union of available freedoms. For example, there are countries in Europe (Switzerland, The Netherlands) with fairly lax drug laws and enforcement (social freedom). There are tax havens (Luxembourg, Bahamas) with very low tax rates (economic freedom). Unfortunately, the drug-tolerant countries tend to be left-wing and have high taxes, while tax havens are more right-wing and socially conservative. We feel that the combination of these two types of freedoms is worth striving for, even if both are restricted to the levels currently being tolerated by the powers-that-be.

Its true that these countries are larger than we'll be, but while this means decreased defense, it also means decreased offensiveness. While things are admittedly easier for established members of the nation-state club, they are not impossible for outsiders (and a country's gotta start somewhere...)

Trouble Back Home

There are a host of reasons why international waters are not a panacea: here is yet another. The Unites States government claims authority over its citizens worldwide, no matter where they are, no matter where they live, no matter where they have been living. Being in the jurisdiction of another country or in international waters is irrelevant. Even if it chooses to ignore your actions while abroad, it may take action when you return - or forbid your doing so.

This is potentially a serious problem for the seastead tourism industry. However, it is worth noting a few points in our favor. First, monitoring the actions of its citizens will be difficult onboard a seastead. Second, the precedents appear to be fairly positive. Donating to a terrorist organization and fighting on the wrong side of a war have caused the US to take action against its citizens in the past. Smoking dope in Amsterdam and getting unlicensed medical treatments in Mexico have not. Steve Kubby may not have been allowed to ease his rare adrenal cancer with medical marijuana in the US, but they have not stopped him from doing so in nearby Canada, where he is formally seeking political asylum from a California drug possession conviction.

Even permanent residents of a seastead will probably want to travel to the mainland to visit relatives, go to conferences, vacation, etc. As usual, the zealot's response - "Renounce your citizenship and don't go back!" - is not only impractical for the masses but no real protection. Contrary to what you may think, it turns out Americans can't just renounce their citizenship and stop paying taxes. The US reserves the right to keep bleeding its former citizens for up to 10 years if a principal purpose of their expatration was to avoid taxes. Certain levels of wealth ($500K) and income (avg. greater than $100K over past 5 years) cause an automatic assumption of tax evasion [HIPAA, Title V, subt. B, sec. 511].

Like many governmental policies, the result is to remove the honorable option. No longer can you simply say "I am done here. I would like to start a new life elsewhere. I owe you nothing, please leave me alone." Instead, the choice is to remain part of a system one abhors or sneak away. If you decide the latter, it can be hard not to feel like a thief in the night - even if a house running away from an expected burglar is a more appropriate metaphor.

One must also remember that countries can and do take action against non-citizens as well. An example is the Russian programmer Dmitry Sklyarov, who in a reversal of Cold War stereotypes was arrested and jailed when he came to the US to give an academic talk (he was eventually acquitted) [CNET_Sky_02]. The relevant comparison we need to make is not "The consequences of doing X on a seastead for an american citizen" vs. "No consequences", because the latter is not an available option. It is "The consequences of doing X on a seastead for an american citizen" vs. "The consequences of doing X on a seastead for a non-american citizen". Citizenship is irrelevant to many of the things that the US is interested in stopping people from doing outside its borders, like terrorism. (Taxation is a notable exception.)

In many areas citizenship offers more protection, not more danger. A dramatic example comes from the differing treatments of american citizens like the "Portland 6", who fought for the Taliban and were kept in domestic american jails, and the foreign prisoners held in the military prison at Guantanamo Bay without access to lawyers or family. The former were given courtroom trials, the latter will get military tribunals at best.

The actual domestic legal consequences of performing various actions onboard a seastead will vary widely, and it will be wise for potential residents to discuss them with an appropriate legal specialist. Simply being in international waters does not justify all actions, and some expressions of personal freedom will cause trouble back home. In the short-term, there is not much we can do about it. Continuing to reside in and support such systems, however, only strengthens their stranglehold. While seasteads may not be magical Zones Without Consequences, they can still offer concealment, refuge, and acceptance. Most importantly, in the long-run, they give us a chance for a better way of life.

Drugs

All nations are required to cooperate in the suppression of the illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances in international waters. International law permits any nation which has reasonable grounds to suspect that a ship flying its flag is engaged in such traffic to request the cooperation of other nations in effecting its seizure. International law also permits a nation which has reasonable grounds for believing that a vessel exercising freedom of navigation in accordance with international law and flying the flag or displaying the marks of registry of another nation is engaged in illegal drug trafficking to request confirmation of registry and, if confirmed, request authorization from the flag nation to take appropriate action with regard to that vessel. Coast Guard personnel, embarked on Coast Guard cutters or U.S. Navy ships, regularly board, search and take law enforcement action aboard foreign-flagged vessels pursuant to such special arrangments or standing, bilateral agreements with the flag state. (See paragraph 3.11.3.2 regarding utilization of U.S. Navy assets in the support of U.S. counterdrug efforts.)

[NWP-LAW, 3.8]

Note that permission of the flagging state is required. Seasteads, if they use a flag, may wish to pick a country which does not have such a standing agreement with the US.

There are many activities, illegal in most of the world, which seasteaders may want to use their freedom to engage in. Recreational drugs, however, bear special mention. On the one hand, local production and use of drugs does not hurt the rest of the world. Producing drugs takes relatively little capital and can produce huge profits. Because of the widespread prohibitionism in the world today and the huge demand for recreational drugs, they are a potentially appealing amenity to enhance the unique seastead experience.

Unfortunately, the political problems involved are huge. The "War on Drugs" is at the forefront of eroding civil liberties, partly because the "war" metaphor suggests a need to win at all costs. Ordinary considerations of property, due process, privacy, and sovereignty go out the window. For example, most of the flagrant, marginally-legal boarding/search/seizure discussed earlier is done to prevent drug smuggling.

While this is a depressing state of affairs, the fact that a single type of activity is responsible for so much state interference suggests a strategy. Namely that by avoiding or restricting that activity, seasteads reduce a large part of their political liability while reducing only one facet of their freedom. Purists will find this unacceptable, and indeed some of your authors have rather strong feelings on the subject. Along with many potential seasteaders, we see legalized drugs as a definite positive. However, we would much rather have a viable seastead with prohibition than to see the project fail because of this political hot potato. Remember our philosophies of compromise, incrementalism, and political realism.

There will be some difficult decisions to make on the drug issue, as with other areas of seastead freedom. There are many potential compromises available. The political feasibility of drugs may be strongly location dependent. For example, it is likely that a drug-legal seastead simply cannot be located in the Caribbean, because of US paranoia. On the other hand, DeepSeasteads will probably be fine. Seasteads near populated but less anti-drug-crazed areas (ie Europe) may also be alright. The separation of risks strategy we mention later can be applied to the drug issue.

Another possibility is centered on the observation that nations care much more about drug smuggling than drug use. Their goal is more to make sure their laws are enforced than to inflict those laws on others. Even those who think drugs ought to be legal may have some acceptance of states' desire to enforce their own laws on their own citizens. Seasteads could thus allow personal use, while banning large-scale production. This is the approach taken by the more liberal European nations, hence it may well be acceptable nearby. The seastead could even take on some of the enforcement burden with a technique like using drug-sniffing dogs on people as they exit. A "Do It Here - And Leave It Here" sort of policy.

Unfortunately, we must add that the sequal to the War on Drugs, namely the War on Terrorism, may add another politically incorrect activity. Libertarian seasteads are likely to be anti-taxes and pro-bank secrecy. Banks with high secrecy can be used for money laundering by terrorists, hence the US may choose to interfere forcefully. The same approach should be taken: identify and evaluate the risks, compare the risks to the gains, look for compromises, and act accordingly.

Political Approaches

{ Should this be moved into more of a "do" section rather than a "describe" section? ie maybe in "Making Things Happen"? Or is it good to talk about both things at once? }

Erwin Strauss summarizes the importance of this issue, as well as how often it is ignored:

When people begin to dream about starting a new country, usually one of the first things they think about is how the country is going to be structured internally...it can at least be said that people are thinking about these problems, which is more than can often be said about some other problems of new countries; problems which have proved fatal to new countries far more than problems of internal organization.

The problem that is most fundamental to a new country is simple survival. The greatest threat to a new country (assuming that its organizers are able to get it off the ground in the first place) is already-existing countries. How can a new country avoid being snuffed out by the established countries as soon as it comes into existence, or shortly thereafter? Grappling with this problem falls into the sphere of human activity known as diplomacy. But diplomacy is a complex business. It is very hard to understand what is going on in the diplomatic world at any time, especially for someone who is not a trained and experienced diplomat.

[Strauss1984, pp. 4-5]

Strauss also discusses why existing countries are likely to dispute claims to territory:

If a new country stakes a claim and is allowed to get away with it, it shuts out the interests of not just one or two nations, but all nations. If such a precedent were allowed to stand, the entire seabed or continent of Antarctica or space itself could be nibbled away by various freelance claimants, leaving the established nations with nothing in those areas. Thus new countries moving into those areas are moving against the interests of the whole body of established nations.

[Strauss1984, p. 9]

While its hard to argue with this analysis of the incentives of new nations, we think that the unique nature of seasteads offer a chance to work around the problem. If seasteads only have jurisdiction over their own mobile structure, not claiming any "real" territory, it is possible that they will not be seen as a threat. After all, they can always be forced to move. If this seems far-fetched, consider that the tonnage of ships plying the world's oceans has been increasing steadily without nations worrying that the oceans are being taken over. The ships are perpetually moving, and they claim no territory - the same can be true of seasteads.

Which Zone?

Territorial Seas

Unless they can achieve an unprecedented treaty for sovereignty, this area is pretty much out for sovereign seasteading. It is a good place for non-sovereign platforms.

Contiguous Zone

This is much the same.

Exclusive Economic Zone

While states' rights here are limited, As described in the definition of EEZ, the clauses do create some problems for seasteads. he assistance of a legal expert will be necessary to determine how serious these are. Seasteads may qualify as regulated artificial installations, they will certainly want to capture some energy, probably do some marine research, and will have to emit some (probably tiny) amount of pollution.

Still, the EEZ is the first point at which real autonomy is possible. Although the coastal state does have jurisdiction over resources, it does not have total sovereignty over these waters. "other States have the freedom of navigation and overflight and of the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and other internationally lawful uses of the sea related to those freedoms" [Gjetnes2000] citing [UNLOS, Article 58]. Thus mobile seasteads are clearly allowed to pass through EEZ's. (Its unclear whether drifting counts as "navigation".) In some ways, this approach parallels the idea of "Perpetual Tourism", an approach used by some freedom seekers. It consists of moving from country to country frequently enough (a few months or years) to never be considered a taxable resident anywhere. This takes advantage of a status intended for temporary travelers to form a permanent lifestyle.

Even for anchored seasteads, things are "EEZier" in this zone. While sovereignty treaties are difficult and have little precedent, Sean Hastings has pointed out that resource usage agreements are much more conventional. While it definitely complicates matters, it may well be possible for a seastead to negotiate a treaty to anchor and harvest renewable resources for some reasonable fee. Its tough to argue that small-scale wind generators or PV panels impose any real cost on nearby states. The main point of EEZ's and continental shelf claims is to control valuable natural resources (oil, gas, minerals). By giving up all such rights, seasteads can co-exist peacefully with other uses, and thus any revenue from them represents pure profit for the coastal state. Of course, political considerations may weigh more heavily than economic ones.

Exclusive Fishing Zone

The suitability of these zones depend on which of the rights they claim. If its fishing onlt, then this is a great location for a seastead. But if they claim some of the other rights (ie everything but minerals/oil), they would be no better than EEZs.

High Seas

This is the least politically problematic place for seasteads. Unfortunately, its also the toughest economically, as they'll be far away from the land-based economy. And while States don't have specific interference rights in the high seas, there is nothing prohibiting them from doing whatever they want to an unflagged ship, or with the flaggers permission. And as we'll mention later, that permission can come later (even years later) to render their actions legitimate.

{CENG: prev par unopened}

Special Zones

Seasteads have to watch out for these cases, but a carefully selected one could also prove the key to achieving freedom at less than 200nm from land.

Flag Of Convenience

The Outlaw Sea describes the colorful history of FOC's:

The system in its modern form, generally known as "flags of convenience", began in the early days of WWII as an American invention sanctioned by the US ogvernment to circumvent its own neutrality laws. The idea was to allow American-owned ships to be re-flagged as Panamanian and used to deliver materials to Britain without concern that their action (or loss) would drag the US unintentionally into war. Afterward of course, the US did join the war - only to emerge several years later with the largest ship registry in the world. By then the purely ecoomic benefits of the Panamanian arrangement had become clear: it would allow the industry to escape the high costs of hiring American crews, to reduce the burdens imposed by stringent regulation, to limit the financial consequences of the occasional foundering or loss of a ship. And so an exodus occurred. For the same reasons, a group of American oil companies subsequently created the Liberian registry (based at frist in New York) for their tankers, as a "development" or international aid projct. Again the scheme was sanctioned by the US government, this time by idealists at the Department of State.

For several decades these two quasi-colonial registries, which attracted shipowners from around the world, maintained reasonably high technical standards, perhaps because behind the scenes they were still subject to some control by the "gentleman's club" of traditional maritime powers - principally Europe and the US. In the 1980s, however, a slew of other countries woke up to the potential for revenues and began to create their own registries to compete for business. The result was a sudden expansion in flags of convenience, and a corresponding loss of control. this happened in the context of an increasingly strong internationalist democratic ideal, by which all countries were formally considered to be equal. The trend accelereated in the 1990s, and paradoxically in direct reaction to a United Nations effort to impose order by demaning a "genuine link" between a ship and its flag - a vague requirement that, typically, was subverted by the righteous "compliance" of everyone involved.

These developments were seemingly as organic as they were calculated or man-made. For the shipowners, they amounted to a profound liberation. By shopping globally, they found that they could choose the laws that were applied to them, rather than haplessly submitting to the jurisdictions of their native countries. The advantages were so great that even the most conservative and well-established shipowners, who were perhaps not naturally inclined to abandon the confines of the nation-state, found that they had no choice but to do so. What's more, because of the registration fees the shipowners could offer to cash-strapped governments and corrupt officials, the various flags competed for business, and the deals kept getting better. The resulting arrangement, though deeply subversive, has an undeniably elegant design. It constitutes an exact reversal of sovereingty's intent and a perfect mockery of national conceits. It is free enterprise at its freest, a logic taken to extremes.
[Lange2004, pp 5-7]

Thus we see several possible courses of action, under current international law. The traditional method would be to buy a flag of convenience (FOC), shop around for a country that has the least objectionable laws and rates, and count on the seller's apathy to minimize restrictions. A seastead is potentially high-profile, and if it proves a serious embarrassment to a registrar it may lose its flag. On the other hand, despite several serious incidents like major oil spills, the small and enterprising nations have continued providing such services. And because flagging is a "virtual"market, that is one in which any country in the world can provide the service, there is a decent chance of finding a reasonable deal. While this is not ideal, it is at least a firmly established political category, and thus fits with our general principle of minimizing novelty. Any group is clearly allowed to build a ship and move it around the oceans.

There are a large number of agreements, treaties, and conventions regarding issues as diverse as environmental protection, resource use, crew safety, minimum wage, holidays, record-keeping and contributions to Seafairers' Welfare Funds. Many nations have signed these, many have not, and they are erratically enforced (it is up to the flagging country to do so). Complying with all these laws would be an onerous process for a project whose goal is freedom, and it is unclear to what degree it will be necessary if we follow the FOC approach. The answer is probably "very little". One Maritime Law consultant writes:

"The Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for Seafarers (STCW) establishes internationally recognised minimum standards for seafarers. Nearly all the flags of convenience countries listed on the ITF list are parties to this Convention. The Convention establishes standards for the deck department, engine department and radio department and deals with all members of the ship's complement...despite their participation in the STCW, open registers are less than rigorous in their application of standards and their monitoring of conditions on board the ship....many of them will accept certificates of competency, which meet very low standards. "
[Ozcayir2000]

Another article says "the operation of flag of convenience fleet is largerly uncontrolled and unmonitored...For many States, there is a wide gap between intentions and enforcement" [StrategicOceans, p. 8]. Further evidence of the spotty enforcement by FOC nations comes from the complaints about the system:

Environmentalists and trade union leaders...want an end to the "Flag of Convenience" (FOC) registry system for fishing vessels which, they say, allows widespread illegal and unreported fishing....the owners of some fishing vessels register them with countries that do not enforce international labor, and environmental regulations. Often these vessels will fish in waters under the jurisdiction of developing countries which do not have the resources to enforce existing regulations and the ability to patrol their offshore waters, environmentalists say.

Greenpeace, the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, the International Transport Workers' Federation and other unions released a report titled: "Troubled Waters: Fishing Pollution and FOCs."

"The FOC problem has reached a point where it is threatening the sustainable development of maritime transport, the protection of the marine environment and the sustainable utilization of marine living resources," it said...

"The way the FOC system works is basically that a country says pay us a fee, we'll register your fishing boat and you're free to fish anywhere, anyway you want to, no questions asked," added Gianni.

[IPS1999]

The choice of FOC country should not merely be a matter of convenience. US law gives the US jurisdiction over "a vessel registered in a foreign nation where the flag nation has consented or waived objection to the enforcement of United States law by the United States." Id. 1903(c)(1)(C). Thus it may be quite important whether or not the flagging country is willing to stand up for us, particularly if the seastead does not have a drug prohibition policy. Because ships have international rights only through their flagging nations, a good relationship is important for many reasons.

Another possibility would be to obtain a flag from a country which formally agreed to a hands-off policy. The seastead would agree to be bound by the flagging country's laws in its interactions with other ships, but would have autonomy for internal affairs. Which affairs are internal and which external, of course, is a matter for eternal debate. While attractive, this sounds rather like a treaty for sovereignty, and may be correspondingly difficult to obtain.

Yet another possibility, suggested by a reader, is to separate seasteads by political risk. The larger platforms, with substantial capital cost, would avoid high-risk activities such as drug production. Much smaller, perhaps even temporary platforms could be used for these risky activities. When people have the urge to do these things, they go off from the main colony so as to separate the activity. The smaller platforms could even fly a separate flag, making it clear that they are different legal entities.

Flagless

Vessels which are not legitimately registered in any one nation are without nationality and are referred to as "stateless vessels". They are not entitled to fly the flag of any nation and, because they are not entitled to the protection of any nation, they are subject to the jurisdiction of all nations. Accordingly, stateless vessels may be boarded upon being encountered in international waters by a warship or other government vessel and subjected to all appropriate law enforcement actions.

Vessels may be assimilated to a ship without nationality, that is, regarded as a stateless vessel, in some circumstances. The following is a partial list of factors which should be considered in determining whether a vessel is appropriately assimilated to stateless status:
a. No claim of nationality
b. Multiple claims of nationality (e.g., sailing under two or more flags)
c. Contradictory claims or inconsistent indicators of nationality (i.e., master's claim differs from vessel's papers; homeport does not match nationality of flag)
d. Changing flags during a voyage
e. Removable signboards showing different vessel names and/or homeports
f. Absence of anyone admitting to be the master; displaying no name, flag or other identifying characteristics
g. Refusal to claim nationality.

[NWP-LAW, 3.11.2.3-4]

More daring seasteads may choose to go flagless, qualifying as artificial islands or installations, or trying to carve a new niche in maritime law.

It is worth noting that some people feel strongly that this is the right course of action. Sean Hastings, former CEO and founder of HavenCo, believes that its important to differentiate these types of structures from existing ones. Flagging a platform puts it into a conventional category of "ship" from the beginning, thus losing valuable initiative. Instead, make it clear that this is a new way of life and new legal categories are needed.

Another approach implied by this philosophy is to ignore EEZ's. If depletable resources (fish, oil) are not touched, and the seastead just anchors itself in an EEZ and only harvests renewable resources, it has a pretty good case that it is not causing any economic harm to anyone. Getting treaties for these things may set a bad precedent. (It will of course be wise to pick the right nation's EEZ